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Renata Rusche 
 
ACTIVITIES OF THE CRIMINAL GROUPS IN KOSOVO & METOCHIA AND 
INDEPENDENCE OF THE PROVINCE 
 
 
In the times of global war on terror and organized crime, the world perceives 
the Middle East or other Muslim communities as the main threat. Despite the events 
of the recent years (terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid or London), it is the 
countries as Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan or Iraq that are considered the source of the 
biggest threat. However, it must be kept in mind that not only these countries pose 
potential threat. It might be the case that the epicenter of another danger is located in 
the closer neighborhood. In Europe there are other focal points, one of them being 
the Balkans, and more accurately: Kosovo & Metochia, called in short Kosmet. Two 
cultures, two traditions and two strong nations meet there: the Serbs and the 
Albanians. Both nations believe that Kosmet should belong to them. Considering the 
great cultural clash and the vast differences of mentalities and traditions, the problem 
seems irresolvable. The name of the province is as controversial as the whole area. 
The word “Kosmet” (the full name of the province is Kosovo & Metochia) has been 
known and used only in the Balkans, it does not occur anywhere else. The Serbs 
believe that not using the name of the Southern part of the province is a friendly 
gesture towards the Albanians, who ignore the name “Metochia” because of 
associations with monasters and the medieval Serbian culture.1 
Kosovo is relatively small – 10,887 km². It has 2 million inhabitants (i.e. 20% of 
Serbia & Montenegro population), of which 98% are ethnic Albanians. The province 
has hardly any independent economy; almost all products are imported from the 
neighboring countries. The Kosovo income amounts to less then 50 million euros per 
year. The question arises – how is the budget planned? How can the unemployed 
inhabitants pay taxes and make a living? It seems thus obvious that there must be 
some other, not necessarily legal, source of revenues. And here we enter the muddy 
waters. No one in Kosovo uses the term “grey zone” openly, but that it does exist is 
acknowledged by everybody, including the international community, OSCE, NATO. It 
                                                 
1 In the text the name of the province will be used interchangeably: Kosovo or Kosovo & Metochia and 
in all cases it will refer to both geographical entities: Kosovo & Metochia. 
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has been estimated that the revenues from illegal sources can amount even to 400 
million euros per annum, what indicates that the relation between the legal and illegal 
income would be 1:8. Kosovo is also the area of Muslim influence, lately 
controversial, what can also positively impact the economic situation and cash influx. 
For example, one of the countries financing building new mosques is Saudi Arabia.  
The province is undoubtedly the grey zone, it is the asylum of the organized 
crime and mafia, and the international forces are indispensable to keep order and 
guarantee public security. It might be because of smuggling and money laundering 
that the inhabitants live so well. Although the US financial and humanitarian 
assistance cannot be forgotten as well.  
At present, the province awaits to get its political status defined. The UN and 
international community are to assist Serbia & Montenegro and Kosovo Albanians in 
finding an optimal solution. It must be remembered that a possible independence of 
Kosovo & Metochia (almost set) is a very dangerous move. In this context, one has to 
realize the cultural, sociological and historical background of the problem. 
The Serbs constantly refer to all Albanian criminal actions as “terrorist”, 
“separatist” or “extremist”. The least significant incident, provoked by a member of 
Albanian community, is almost always shown as ethnically driven terrorist attack 
directed against the persecuted and discriminated Serbian minority. It must be 
admitted that the range of designations used by the Serbian media to describe a 
common criminal act or the types of extremist activities is truly impressive. It should 
be noticed though that to a great extent it is propaganda. It should be nevertheless 
admitted that these definitions are proper in many cases and for many activities. To 
understand the complexity of the problem, some of its aspects need to be looked at 
more closely.   
 
 
1.THE CLANS 
 
Albanian nation is organized according to the strict rules of national community 
and kinship. Therefore, the characteristic of the Albanian crime structures is that they 
are based on the respect for territorial divides, which reflect the spheres of influence 
of clans. According to this divide, the “basic” membership in the abovementioned 
groups is fisu, i.e. a larger family, which controls the given territory. Several fisus 
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make a clan. This division of the Albanian society is rooted in the traditional clan 
hierarchy, in the closed character of the impermeable relations in the strict discipline 
of the family members. If we look at the Albanian house from the perspective of the 
medieval code Leke Dukadjinija, in its ethnologic and socio-cultural aspects, then it 
becomes a very important institution. And in the situation where there is no state, it 
has the key role in maintaining national identity and autochthon culture. In a sense 
such a house can be seen as a “microstate”, where the chief of government is the 
master of the house, the head of the family, the host. There are also other important 
people, who play the role of ministers and who accomplish important tasks assigned 
by the head of the family. The everyday life is sanctioned by the legal norms of the 
Leke Dukadjinija code and the religious norms. “Political life” takes place in special 
rooms called oda.2 In Kosovo, the odas functioned as a type of parliament, where the 
issues where discussed; oda was also the place of the council, which members were 
older and more experienced people. Different rules would apply here; people knew 
what was allowed and what was not allowed. The decisions of the head of the family 
and of this special microparliament were the only regulation the Albanians accepted 
freely and eagerly (Filipović 2002). 
Taking into account the fact that the clans are based on the blood relations, 
what limits the number of the people in the clan, these relations are very strong, and 
accession or penetration by other people is practically impossible. Representatives of 
other communities, especially national communities, can be adjoined only as 
contractors to perform defined, one-time and secondary tasks.  Moreover, the 
Albanian mafia families are organized in 3-4 levels, what makes it possible to keep 
the organization working even when its member or group has been uncovered.   
Today Albanian society faces a serious problem; the family, the only institution 
that could guide and govern the people, has been completely destroyed by the 
resettlements and migrations of the inhabitants. This has demolished the social 
norms and existing regulations.   
In opposition to the fact that the clans respect a precise territorial divide, where 
each family controls a certain area and criminal sphere, the individual clans engage 
                                                 
2 Oda is a name of a room in the Albanian house, where the important meetings with family members 
coming from afar are held. These rooms are closed to women, and even the meal is served by the 
youngest boy in the given community. 
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in competition. This is the outcome of political differences or the endeavors of 
different groups to control the vastest territory possible.  
Despite the international protectorate in Kosovo has begun its sixth year, and 
the fact that many appropriate legal provision have been introduced in this period, the 
medieval custom law of Leke Dukadjinija still persists with its vendetta, clan revenge, 
clan honor and kin relations. The threat of the mandatory clan revenge (krvna osveta) 
for traitors or people who breach an agreement, ensures protection for the terrorists 
and at the same time it is the most common motive of homicides among the 
Albanians. It does not matter if someone belongs to the higher caste or not, the right 
of vendetta is practiced in all social classes. The Leke Dukadjinija Code forbids killing 
children, women, the elderly mentally ill or a person, who is in the area belonging to a 
jamija3 or an orthodox church – everything that is near the building is sacred. For 
ages the conditions of the Code would fill the vacuum caused by absent judiciary and 
legal provisions. The Code is binding together with the regulations defined by the 
state administration. In the circles, where the clan relationships are very strong, the 
new law loses with the ancient rules. The rules of the Code when referring to 
homicide leave no place for doubts: the family of the victim is obliged to kill one male 
member of the assassin’s family; “the blood is paid for with blood.” Such a law could 
only lead to killing all male representatives of the family. The male family members of 
the person responsible for the killing could leave the house only having had the 
guarantee of security provided by the other clan (so called besa, i.e. the word). Some 
analysts underline that in the times of lawlessness, the Code would regulate and 
even limit the number of homicides. Vendetta is still very important and it influences 
the regulations of everyday life, especially in the mountain regions and in the 
underdeveloped, remote and difficult to reach areas. The new legal system has not 
found its place in the mentality of the people following the ages-long traditions. The 
politicians try not to comment on this phenomenon. The respect for the old Code can 
be observed also in Montenegro, still in 2005 there was a known case of two families, 
Kaludjerović and Marković, who had followed vendetta for 14 years. The cases of 
vendetta occurred in Nikšić, Podgorica, and even among the emigrants in Detroit. In 
Albania of Enver Hodja, the vendetta was severely punished. It is said however, that 
after 1997 there have been ca. 1800 homicides related to this custom. The common 
                                                 
3 Jamija (Turkish) – a Muslim temple. 
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belief has it that the family revenge is characteristic merely for Albania and 
Montenegro. However, it seems turns out that the custom is still alive also in other 
Balkan territories.   
Not long ago, the inhabitants of Kosovo witnessed the vendetta in the political 
milieu. The Haradinaj family officially accused Musaj family that they have been in 
close relations with Serbian authorities since 1999, what was supposedly the main 
cause of the abuses the Haradinajs suffered in that period. It was most probably a 
political conflict and it started in 1999. Sinan Musaj was one of the witnesses during 
the process of the UÇK Dukadjini group (the commandant of that group was Ramush 
Haradinaj). The group was accused of kidnapping, torturing and killing of four 
members of the competing group called The Armed Forces of the Kosovo Republic. 
Dukadjini group was supported by the Haradinaj clan. Five witnesses in the process, 
including Sinan Musaj, were killed already in 1999 in the action ordered by the 
Dukadjini group. In 2000 there was an exchange of fire, where two brothers, Ramush 
and Daut Haradinaj were injured. Before the beginning of the process, in 2003, Ismet 
Musaj was killed in unknown circumstances. At the beginning of 2005, during an 
attack in Peći, Sadik Musaj was deadly injured. Ramush Haradinaj, who at that time 
was the Prime Minister of Kosovo, rejected all allegations that his family or he himself 
had anything to do with Sadik’s death. In April 2005, Enver Haradinaj, Ramush’s4 
brother, was killed. In July 2005, Djeljadin Musaj and his grandson were 
assassinated. There has been no further revenge since then.  
The second most known contemporary conflict was the dispute between 
Zemaj and Haradinaj clans. Tahir Zemaj organized training for ca. 500 members of 
FARK – a formation competing with UÇK of Ramush Haradinaj and Hashim Taqi. In 
the mid-1998, Zemaj and his soldiers “dared” to quarter in Glodjane – the Ramush 
Haradinaj’s home village. In consequence, because of the bad relations with the UÇK 
commandants, Zemaj had to stay for a long time in Albania. Zemaj was a witness in 
the process against Dautov Haradinaj, and that was the reason why in 2001-2002 
Ramush and his supporters tried to kill him. The attempt succeeded only in January 
2003, when apart from Tahir, also his son Enis and nephew Hisen got killed.   
                                                 
4 Prime minister of Kosovo & Metochia. 
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The brutality observed in the clan fights was also showed in the slaughter of 
the Keljmendi family in Peći (2003). The sentence was delivered by the members of 
Luka clan.  
 
 
2. FORMS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES 
 
And thus we are approaching the core of the issue – terrorism and organized 
crime in Kosovo & Metochia. Both activities are very strongly related to each other in 
the Balkans; one cannot function without another. It is extremely difficult to separate 
the mafia activity from the activity of the organized criminal groups, or the terrorist or 
extremist activities linked to ethnicity. What is the difference between the two 
concepts in the first place?  To put it most generally, mafia has the objective of 
gaining influence in the circles of power, its objectives are supranational, it is not 
interested in the borders or ethnic conflicts; the crime focuses on the direct profits 
from the activities. The clans do not necessarily need to be driven by a higher 
objective as gaining control of the province; they are mostly interested in their own 
zones of influence. The mafia’s aspirations can be more global. Unfortunately, both 
one as the other constitute a big danger in such unstable areas as Kosovo, or even 
the Balkans in general.  
According to one of the popular Serb analysts, Tomislav Kresovič, the Balkan 
terrorism and organized crime can took on several different forms of activities:  
1. terrorism of Albanian separatists: ideas of the “Great Kosovo” and “Great 
Albania”, the forms of so called “red-black” terrorism manifest themselves; it is a 
continuation of the radicalism and neofascism of Enver Hodja, 
2. Albanian and Serbian underground closely cooperating on the “white terrorism”, 
i.e. Drug trafficking; the activity is definitively international, it joins the politics, 
crime and mafia in the fight against official authorities,  
3.  “green terrorism”, i.e. Islam radicalism, can be a great threat; it can merge with 
the Albanian separatist movement and the Albanian-Turkish mafia in Serbia and 
in the region of Southern-Eastern Europe; Islam terrorism might have a wide 
range of influence: from Bosnia & Herzegovina, Sandjak, Kosovo & Metochia, 
parts of Montenegro and Southern Serbia, 
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4. “blue terrorism” is the “sponsored” violence, crisis endorsement and destruction of 
democratic governments; it is related to the interests of individual international 
mafias with business affairs in Serbia (Kresovič 2003). 
 
It is commonly known that the most sensitive issues in the province are drugs and 
their distribution. These are also the most widely known topics in the context of illegal 
activity. Drugs are an easily available good; there is a constant demand for it. 
According to the information given by Interpol and other world organizations, 
Albanian mafia running drug business is one of the best in the world. It is very well 
organized, professional, international. It must be also remembered that as far as 
national issues it has its own code of behavior and it does not engage in ethnic 
conflicts or struggle for independence. For example: the relations between Albanian 
and Serbian mafia were very deep, even in the times of the conflict between Serbia 
and UÇK. It is clearly the underground that can be interested in destabilizing the 
situation in the region and in realization of the objectives complying with its interest. 
In this context the term “Great Albania” or “Great Kosovo” can be analyzed.  
 
 
 
3. GREAT ALBANIA AND MAFIA’S DRUG BUSINESS 
 
There have been several stages in the history of Kosovo which are perceived 
by Serbs as a clear attack on their national identity and the attempt to get control 
over the lands, motivated by the national and “great Albania” slogans. The first case 
is the I Prizren League created in June 1878, after the Russian-Turkish war.  The 
agreement promoted integration of Albanian lands and Muslim and Albanian 
domination in the region. These objectives were to be reached through the struggle 
against the Ottoman Empire and other neighboring countries. II Prizren League was 
established during the IIWW (1941) as a subordinated state of the Third Reich. It is 
hypothesized that in this way the Germans wanted to gain access to the Kosovo 
natural resources. Another example of the Albanian national aspirations was the 
Albanian-American Civic League created in 1989 in New York by the congressman 
Joseph Diogardi.  
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The “Great Albania” concept has been often identified with the ambition of all 
Albanians, as a nation. Nothing more misleading. Contemporary Tirana has never 
had such policy; moreover, the Albanians from Kosovo and Albanians from Albania 
are almost two diverse nations. What makes the difference is the culture, the 
standard of living.5 Moreover, it would be curious to look for such ambitions in the 
state, which is facing many internal challenges – the weak economy, political and 
social conflicts and the mass exodus of Albanians to Greece or Italy.   
It is exactly the criminal underworld for which the project of “Great Kosovo” 
and “Great Albania”.6 It depends to a great extent on the dynamics of Albanian mafia, 
its objectives, and aspirations of individual clans. It is believed that the project might 
be even an attempt to create a drug state (Albanian federation with drug cartels 
playing the role of financial and then political centers). According to Americans’ 
warnings there is a possibility that “Colombian syndrome” could emerge in the 
Balkans, what means that the organized crime could take over the total control not 
only over Kosovo, but over all areas inhabited by Albanians, as well as several social 
life spheres. The intention to create a great Albanian “grey zone state” has been 
skillfully disguised under the slogans of national rights for Albanians and the struggle 
for independence. Should even some of the plans be realized, the influence of the 
mafia on the Balkans would be unimaginably strong. It might even chase out the 
Italian and the Russian mafia from the South Eastern Europe. Of course, the 
Albanian mafia cooperates with other similar organizations – Serb, Bulgarian, Italian 
and Russian mafias. It is one of the largest in Europe and it has a significant 
influence on the political life in the Balkan countries mostly by establishing a “criminal 
bridge” with other mafias in the region. Italian police claims that the Albanian mafia in 
Italy is so numerous and powerful that it has been capable of win the fight with the 
Turkish drug dealers and it turned out to be a good partner for some Italian mafia 
organizations, e.g. the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, the Neapolitan Camorra, the Calabrian 
N’dranghetta, and Sacra Corona Unita from Apulia province. The Albanian drug 
                                                 
5 The problem has been discussed in depth in a socio-cultural journal Kranogruda pt: „Albania, 
Kosovo, Macedonia”. The individual articles indicate the differences conditions by the historical, social, 
cultural and religious factors; Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, „Krasnogruda” no 15, Sejny 2002. 
6 The ideas of a great state which exist in the Balkans can be understood in many ways. The idea of 
the Great Kosovo or the Great Albania can be perceived from a different point of view, to understand it 
as a thesis promoted by Serbia, and which aims at keeping the Serbian territorial claims to the 
province alive. According to this argument, any crisis in Kosovo or on the South of Serbia can be used 
to persuade the international community that any disintegration in the Balkans leads to a greater 
destabilization.  
Center for International Relations© 
 9
dealers have become organizers of the criminal network, which right now employ 
criminals of other nationalities.7 Undoubtedly, the Albanian mafia can be interested in 
destabilizing situation in the Balkans, as well as different forms of criminality – 
including political assassinations and support for paramilitary organizations, as 
AKSh.8 It can be “justified” by vendetta and the slogans of the national struggle for 
independence. The future independence of the province, almost decided now, will 
provide a vast freedom of movement. The presence of the international organizations 
or NATO is not a problem either. In reality, these are additional factors driving the 
economy, providing the demand for not necessarily legal services (e.g. prostitution) 
or goods. In the inglorious part of their history, the international organizations had to 
take legal responsibility for their representatives’ engagement in smuggling, human 
trafficking, money laundering or “ordinary” corruption. We can suppose that the 
objective of the Albanian criminal structures is to gain control over the key spheres of 
the public life – politics and business. The problem has been also pointed at by the 
Czech “Hospodařskié Noviny”. The journalists turn out attention to the influence of 
the drug criminal organizations on the political life, on the relations the contemporary 
Kosovo politicians have with the illegal structures and the illegal cash flow.  
Considering the above information, it becomes clear that the interests of the 
mafia and other criminal groups can be very close, and they can often merge in the 
real world.    
But even the most qualified criminals cannot work wonders if the so-called 
natural factors are not on their side. In the case of Kosovo, it is its geographical 
position – almost perfect for this type of activities. The Balkans, including Kosovo & 
Metochia, lie on the routes of many communication corridors joining the Middle East 
with Europe and “the rest of the world”. The most known is the so-called Corridor no 
10 going through the territories of six countries, from Salzburg to Thessaloniki. The 
corridor no 10 is of a great economic and communication importance, it is a network 
of roads joining Greece and Turkey with the Western Europe. Its joint length is 2360 
km, of which 800-km go through Serbia. It has also the ramifications going to 
Budapest and Sofia. The Corridor no 8 joins Albania, FYRM, Bulgaria, Greece and 
Turkey. It goes from the Albanian port Durrës through Skopje to the Bulgarian port 
                                                 
7 Vecernije novosti, Narko-mreža OVK, “Večernije novosti” 14.11.2003, 
www.novosti.co.yu/vest.asp?vest=549&rubrika=Feljeton  
8 AKSh (Alb. Armata Kombetarë Shqiptare) – Albanian National Army. 
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Burgas, to finish in Istanbul. The East-West direction of the corridor aims at 
establishing the communication between the Adriatic Sea and the Balkans and the 
Black Sea and the Middle East. These are the two most important communication 
routes. The two less important, but also significant, are Corridor no 7 (Danube river) 
and the Corridor no 5 going to Venice via Triest, Kpar, Lubljana, Budapest, Uzohorod 
and Lviv. The last route has the ramifications joining Rieka, Zagreb and Ploča – 
Sarajevo – Osijek – Budapest. 
 Until the beginning of the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the major 
part of the European and American drug market had been covered by the drugs 
coming through so called Balkan Route. The Route led from the “source” countries as 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, where the goods were produced, to Greece, Bulgaria, 
Social Federation of Yugoslavia, and Romania to the Western Europe. The start of 
the war in Yugoslavia posed some complications; the need to organize new ways of 
transport emerged. Thus two alternative routes were created: the Southern one – 
from Turkey through Bulgaria, FYRM, Kosovo, Albania to Italy; and the Northern one 
– from Turkey via Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and further on to Western Europe. 
When the military activities in Yugoslavia ceased, the old route was back in use, but 
the smuggling was kept also on the new routes. Thus the network got much wider.  
One of the channels, through which the drugs are transported from Turkey to 
Italy, and then to Europe, goes via Tropojë and port Drač (Durrës) and Vlora in 
Albania. The drug and weapon smuggling occurs also through the official border 
checkpoints as e.g. General Janković (Hani Elezit), Jažince, Ćafa Prut, Morin and 
Tropojë, thanks to the cooperation of the criminal groups with corrupted custom 
officers or TMK and KPS representatives. Americans have even introduced a special 
name for the Albanian mafia structures specializing in drugs. In the CIA and BND 
documents, “Kamila” is the name of the cartel specializing in heroine sells, one of the 
five most powerful in the world. In 1994, the Paris group for “investigating” drugs 
claimed that the Albanian mafia from FYRM and Kosovo sells heroine to buy 
weapons for their kinsmen in Kosovo and Metiochia. Drug basis were to be situated 
in Skopje, Scadar and Pristina, the drugs were directed to Switzerland, Germany, 
Italy and Greece.9  
                                                 
9 „Glas Javnosti”, 11.03.2003. 
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The drug trade means great profits and high cash flow. In this context the 
question of activities run by mafia or terrorists or organized crime emerges. Leaving 
aside such activities as trade of excised goods, robberies and brigandage. The 
money received from the drug trade often becomes a payment for the illegal 
weapons, which in turn are ordered by extremist groups. In consequence, the mafia 
can be involved in terrorist action, so called struggle for independence, and 
realization of political aims using neither really peaceful nor democratic methods. 
Corruption is a similar case – a big sum is surely a convincing argument for many 
politicians, representatives of the state institutions etc. Assuming the mafias are 
professional and have global objectives, it might be supposed that a proper 
protection of the influences in all key state structures is highly probable. A good 
position on the international crime scene makes the realization of strategic, political 
and economic objectives easier. It must be reminded though, that despite the fact 
that mafia is not a centralized structure, it can present enough of a threat for the 
regional and European security.  
 
 
 
5. HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
 
While discussing the criminal activities in the former Yugoslavia, it is 
impossible to forget about the phenomenon of human smuggling and trafficking.  
Because of the wars and conflicts, the problem has not been rather known, it has 
passed almost unobserved in the region. In the Serbia of Slobodan Milosevic, the 
human trafficking “had no reason to exists”, it was unwelcome and politically 
inconvenient. The whole region is facing the problems of permeability of borders, 
political instability of some of administrative units, and in consequence – the lacking 
strong security policy that would make illegal migrations difficult. The socio-economic 
situation has a huge impact on the very existence of such business. The people in 
the lowest social strata see their chance for a better living in migration. Therefore the 
smugglers have no problems finding clients.  
It must be noted that human smuggling is strictly related to human trafficking, 
however these are two distinct activities. In most cases, smuggling becomes 
trafficking. Smuggling is a service directly related to the payment for illegal border 
Center for International Relations© 
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crossing of the client. Trafficking is about recruiting and smuggling in a person to a 
place using violence and force, to exploit her sexually or economically. Smuggling is 
about the illegal border crossing; trafficking means human rights violations through 
exploitation. The basic difference is that a smuggled immigrant crosses the border at 
his own free will, whereas the victim of traffickers is only merchandise, for which the 
destination is chosen. Another difference is that smuggling involves actual border 
crossing, while trafficking can take place on a territory of one state.   
All types of smuggling routes meet in the Balkans. “The Balkans is the main 
route of the asylum seekers, who want to get into the Western Europe”– says Louise 
I. Shelley, the head of the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center Washington.10 
The Department of State defines in detail the “smuggling status” of the individual 
countries: Serbia & Montenegro are defined as a country of exit, transit and 
destination for the trafficked victims, and a country of internal trade of Roma children 
forced to beg. Kosovo & Metochia have a similar status. As for Albania, women and 
children are most often smuggled out for sexual exploitation and slave work – 
Greece, Italy, the UK and France being the destination countries. Bosnia & 
Herzegovina is also a country of exit and transit.11 
In the last two years, the police discovered two routes used to smuggle 
nationals of China, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Kurdistan and Egypt. The first route led 
from Albania through Kosovo and Serbia to Hungary; the second one led from Turkey 
through Bulgaria and Serbia to Croatia and further on to Slovenia. There is also the 
third route going from Moldavia through Romania and Serbia & Montenegro to Italy. 
The prices of the third route were decisively higher than in the case of the other two; 
they oscillate between 2,500 and 4,000 euros. The service is most expensive for the 
Chinese, who want to get to the EU countries: they have to pay up to 10,000 USD.  
Until the closure of the sea passage from Albania to Italy, ca. 95,000 
immigrants had managed to use that route to get to the EU. Since then, the land 
routes have gained on importance, especially the border with Kosovo.12 The Northern 
border of Albania is most commonly used for smuggling and trafficking. 
The impermeability of the borders is conditioned by existing smuggling routes. 
The less intensive checks on a crossing, the higher possibility that it can become an 
                                                 
10 www.ekonomist.co.yu/magazin/perspektive, 4.03.2006. 
11 www.okc-media.org 
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entry point of a smuggling route. Such a phenomenon has been observed at the 
airports in Sarajevo and Tuzla (B&H), where, after the introduction of visas and 
stronger border controls, the crime groups had to look for an alternative smuggling 
route. In this way the center of the activity was moved to the airport in Pristina.13 
At the end of 2005, thanks to the joint action of the Greek, Albanian and 
Macedonian police, a network dealing with smuggling from Albania through FYRM to 
Greece was smashed. The cost of a “trip” was ca 1,000-1,500 euros. In November 
2003, thanks to a common action of the Hungarian and Austrian police, two 
organized groups of smugglers were disrupted: Romanian-Moldavian, and Serbian-
Albanian (all together 42 people). The group was acting through travel agencies, and 
its clients were mainly Albanians from Kosovo. A client would be transported to 
Hungary first, and then through the green border he would get to Austria. What was 
interesting and significant in this particular case was that the criminals were 
organized in international groups. The phenomenon was thus unusual, especially for 
the Serbian-Albanian group, constituted by two, according to many analysts, enemy 
nations. It proves the thesis that the organized crime is an international phenomenon, 
and its objectives are not to be identified with the national ambitions or individual 
nationalist aspirations. 
Ratko Mihaljović, operation officer on the Rudnica checkpoint (Northern 
Kosovo), claims that the aim of the immigrants is the Croatian border and further on 
the Western European countries; “They get off the cars before the checkpoint, then 
they walk to Raška on foot, and the driver legally crosses the border in the empty car. 
He waits for the passengers few kilometers beyond the checkpoint. The network is 
very developed, the helpers, whose task is to facilitate the border crossing, are 
engaged in every part of Serbia.”14 He stresses that the smuggled persons have 
nothing to do with terrorists, they are unarmed; their only aim is to cross the border.  
Compared to trafficking, the human smuggling does not require such a 
significant operational and logistic engagement, mostly because of the less complex 
objectives of the activity. The hierarchy within the crime organizations can be defined 
by the preferences, objectives and requirements of the clients. The mid-rank criminal 
                                                                                                                                                        
12 Albania and Kosovo border is 174 km long, mostly unguarded land. Only in the first 9 months of 
2004, 365 attempts of illegal crossings were noted. 
13 Izvestaj o stanju u oblasti organizovanog i privrednog kriminala u Jugoistocnoj Evropi, (Serb.), 
European Commission, CARPO regionalni projekat, Strazburg 2005, p.31. 
14 www.avp.vranje.yu (21.02.2005). 
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groups can have the capacity to secure the whole trip (from the acquisition of false 
documents to crossing the border with travel agencies and tourist operators, often 
linked to the crime underworld). The high-rank criminal groups have even the 
capacity to provide the migrant with the logistic support in the destination country.   
A problem per sé is the trafficking of women and children destined to work in 
sex industry. The scale of this activity is very high. Such a situation is favored not 
only political factors (permeability of borders, lack of legal regulations), but mostly the 
catastrophic economic situation in the region. Young women are offered attractive job 
and good wages abroad – in bars as waitresses or dancers, as domestic workers or 
nannies. Women do not realize that in reality they are recruited for the sex industry. 
According to the UNICEF data, the victims of trafficking are sold to Bosnia, Kosovo, 
FYRM and Western Europe (Čolak 2003). What is important, in the case of 
immigrants, the smuggling is based on illegal border crossing, while human trafficking 
can include legal crossing. The groups of traffickers responsible for the delivery to a 
given country of destination make a special effort to cross the border legally. Thanks 
to that, the business goes unnoticed by the border guards, what becomes a great 
facilitation considering the complexity of the service.  
The reports of IOM State that the victims of trafficking are aged between 14 
and 30, they have low level of education, and they come from families in a difficult 
economic situation. It is very often political situation, economic recession, and 
restriction of migration to cause the disillusioned people to look for solutions abroad. 
Serbian police estimates that 1,000,000 people annually become victims of 
trafficking, of which 200,000 only in the Balkans. 
The Balkans is the area of many transit roads and routes. Montenegro is the 
transit country between Serbia and Albania and Western Europe. One of the 
Montenegro channels goes across the Lake of Scalar to Albania, further on the route 
leads to Greece, FYRM and Kosovo. The smuggling between Serbia and Bosnia & 
Herzegovina is perpetuated mainly along the Drain River. On the East border of 
Serbia, human smuggling goes through the Danube or mountain roads to Romania 
and Bulgaria. Macedonian IOM reports that there are two main channels of women 
trafficking – one from Kumanovo, where the women are sold to FYRM and Greece, 
Albania and Turkey; the second – through the Macedonian-Bulgarian border. The 
Balkan Route is one of the most known itineraries; it is used for smuggling of goods 
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and people. Because of the restrictive visa regime in the EU countries, the women 
trafficking goes mainly to Balkan states, which borders are not so much of a barrier.   
For the mafia and the criminal organizations, human trafficking and sex 
slavery became a priority in 1999, when thousand of women from Kosovo ran away 
to Albania. Council of Europe representatives believe that the growth of sex business 
was partly fueled by the presence of the foreign army in the province. The presence 
of the international military forces created a great market for the sex services, and in 
consequence the women trafficking had to increase. In the end of the 1990s, 18 
items figured on the list of bars and places allegedly involved in human trafficking 
published by the UNMIK. By 2001, the number had grown to 75, and in January 
2004, the list included over 200 items.15 Only in 2004, in Pristina, over 50 hotels and 
similar objects were closed down, under suspicion of illegal sex services. In 
September 2005, the Director of USAID in Pristina, Ken Yamashita, pointed to the 
alarming statistical data in the province – the number of female victims of trafficking 
equaled the number of all trafficked from abroad.16 Such situation had never occurred 
before. There is one more possibility – in the face of growing controls and fight 
against illegal prostitution, the business might have moved from bars to private 
houses, what makes any control much more difficult.  
Representatives of the international community in Kosovo & Metochia are also 
concerned by the information that the UN staff in the province has been also involved 
in the network of human trafficking. In the end of 2005, three UNMIK policemen and 
four foreigners were arrested with charges of participation in trafficking. At the 
beginning of September 2005, they were released from prison by virtue of the 
decision of an international judge; the official reason for release was lack of 
evidence.17 
Amnesty International claims in its last report that the women trafficking in 
Kosovo & Metochia is still a very serious problem. The Center for Protection of 
Women and Children in Pristina accuses international community that it is largely 
responsible for the blooming phenomenon known as sex trafficking. The AI, in the 
report on the protection of human rights (covering the period from January to 
December 2004), mentions that the international community is partially to be blamed 
                                                 
15 Izveštaj o stanju..., p.26. 
16 www.orgkriminal.org/default.asp?st=c&str=1&lis=1&ci=1287451  
17  www.orgkriminal.org/default.asp?st=v&str=1&p=1&lis=1&ve=1282591  
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for the present situation, because it is responsible for the border controls. Of course, 
the local authorities are also to be blamed. It is impossible that girls from Moldova or 
Romania would enter Kosovo & Metochia and the international representatives would 
not know what happens to them later on. In 2001, UNMIK published a regulation 
which foresees the penalties for traffickers and the clients using the services of the 
sex slaves. Of course, the number of the punished is very low, what can be explained 
by the links the accused have with the higher bodies. Neeraj Singh, the UNMIK 
speaker, said: “In 2004, 77 people were arrested with charges of human trafficking 
and prostitution. Till the end of February 2005, 13 people were arrested. According to 
UNICEF, Kosovo & Metochia is the transit and destination area.”18 
UNMIK and international community are aware of the weight of the problem. They 
try to fight it together engaging all resources available – collectively with other 
international institutions as OSCE or PISG.  
 
 
 
5.INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO? 
 
The struggle for independence of the province is still going on. Some analysts 
believe that it has been decided a long time ago, and that the present political 
negotiations concern mainly the status of the ethnic minorities. Dušan Bataković, the 
counselor of the president of Serbia, claims that the policy of Belgrade, which went 
against the will of international community (for ideological reasons), resulted in a 
situation where Serbia & Montenegro became “a destabilizing factor” in the Balkans. 
The internationalization of the Kosovo issue not only shows that the state policy was 
wrong, but also that the strategic vision has been different from the new Balkan 
political order based on fragmentarization. Considering the gradual accession of the 
Balkan states to the Atlantic program “Partnership for Peace”, there is a real threat 
that Serbia & Montenegro will find itself surrounded by the states collaborating with 
NATO. In such case, the state territory may be further divided – by changes of 
internal borders, and by the demarcation of different external borders in the last 
stage. In this context, should unexpected outburst of violence occur, the Albanian 
                                                 
18 www.slobodnaevropa.org , 30.05.2005. 
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movement in Kosovo could become an internal barrier for the Serb aspirations and 
for the future of the Serbian rule on the given territory.19 The problem of the status of 
the province seems very complex. On one hand, the independence of Kosovo & 
Metochia is perceived as the next step towards the disintegration of the region and 
imperilment of the ethnic minorities. On the other hand, there are voices claiming that 
the independent Kosovo could facilitate integration of all ethnic minorities in one 
Kosovo society, what could open the way to real solutions for their problems. The 
artificial prolonging of the present status quo does not develop Balkan policy and 
does not improve the situation in the province.  
It is rather unlikely that Serbia & Montenegro keeps the province within its 
borders. The future political status of Kosovo is a controversial topic and it has been 
a problem for the world leaders for many years. Some of them seem to have come to 
terms with the idea of a new country. Maybe in the context of the information 
provided above, the world should take a closer look at its new creation to be called 
Independent Republic of Kosovo. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 www.balkan-archive.org.yu, D. Bataković „Kosovo i Metohija:istorijsko nasledje i geopoliticka 
ogranicenja”. 
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Human trafficking – the map20 
 
 
 
 
- from Russia 
 
- from Ukraine 
  
 - from Romania 
 
                                                 
20 The map comes from the White Book published by the Serbia & Montenegro government in 2003, 
Albanski terorizam i organizowani kryminal na Kosovu i Metohiji ,s. 50, www.media.srbija.sr.gov.yu.  
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- from Moldova 
 
- from Bulgaria 
 
 the final routes  
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